I. INTRODUCTION HE sale of prepaid electricity is becoming more prevalent political conditions. In 1998, Eskom (the electricity utility) developed the "Electricity for All" concept that was intended to supply electricity directly to a large portion of the population [I].
In order to facilitate the prepayment of electricity, the STS (Standard Transfer Specification) was developed. STS is a specification that allows the use of tokens as a means of vending prepaid electricity that is then released at the customer's premises by an ED (Electricity Dispenser). A customer purchases a token for a certain value from a vendor.
This token contains information that, when provided to an ED, makes the corresponding amount of electricity available.
T. in South Africa due to the current economic, social and The required vending infrastructure for the sale of tokens is called the Common Vending System (CVS). CVS includes Credit Dispensing Units (CDUs), System Master Stations (SMSs), and Transaction Managers (TMs). CDUs are used to provide tokens directly to customers. They are capable of creating the appropriate tokens given information from the customer, such as the meter number and the amount of electricity credit required. SMSs are used to concentrate transaction data collected by CDUs. This concentrated information is gathered by the T M s and passed to a high-level management system ' that records purchases, monitors electricity usage, and does the necessary accounting.
OFF-LINEVENDING
The existing CVS is an off-line vending system that consists of multiple CDUs, SMSs, and TMs. The CDUs, SMSs, and T M s constitute the CVS. The Management Information System (MIS) consists of the TMs, CIS DB and whatever other infrasmchue is required. The TMs form the gateway between the two systems.
Because CVS is off-line, information relating to transactions that occur at a CDU is not immediately available to the SMSs, TMs or CIS DB. At some point after the transaction has been completed at the CDU, the details pertaining to the transaction are transferred to the SMS.
The combination of STS and CVS currently operates as follows: A customer purchases a token from a vendor that has a CDU. This CDU contains a security module that is capable of generating the electricity token without any interaction with a higher-level management system, such as the SMSs or the TMs. Once a customer has paid for a token of a certain value, this token is generated for the customer. The details of every completed transaction are later sent to the centralized database for analysis and accounting purposes.
All of the information, encryption algorithms and keys that are required are available at the CDU and are stored in a security module. The fact that all of this information is deployed in thousands of CDUs in the field makes the system vulnerable to this information, in the form of the security modules, being stolen.
Because the mode of operation of CVS is off-line, synchronization problems can arise in the communication between the CDUs and SMSs. Should data become compt in transit, or not be timeously available at the SMSs, the integrity of the information available to the Th4s and hence the CIS DB will be compromised.
The SMSs act as data concentrators that consolidate information received from the various CDUs linked lo it.
as the gateway to the higher level management system. SMSs are no longer necessary because the need to geographically concentrate communication no longer exists.
The purchase of a token involves the following steps between a CDU and a T M 1) A customer requests a token from a CDU for .li certain meter for a certain monetary value. 2) A request is sent from the CDU to the TM ststing the identity of the vending server and the actual request for a token.
3) The TM will generate a token and send it back to the CDU, once it bas been determined that the CDU will honor payment, the customer has no outstanding debt, 2) None, or very little, control over the CDU I SMS synchronization process, which can lead to data management problems. 3) Lack of effective support and management of new tariffs, e.g. the Electricity Basic Support Service Tariffs (EBSST) where each customer receives a certain amount of free electricity on a monthly basis. Due to its off-line operation, the existing system has been plagued by various security-related problems, such as fraudulent vending transactions and banking errors. This is due to discrepancies between completed transactions and the information that is provided to the CIS DB. Marketing results show that the biggest problem regarding prepaid electricity,
-.
In terms of CVS, on-line vending means that communication occurs between a CDU and the TM !'or every transaction. The logical configuration is indicated i.1 Fig. 2 An important advantage of on-line vending -for the purposes of fraud prevention -is that CDUs no Iongm need to be able to generate tokens independently, i.e. a security module does not need to be present at the CDU. Given that on-line vending requires communication between CDU and TM during every transaction, the CDU becomes merely an interface for a customer to request a token liom the centralized database. In this scenario, a CDU is no longer an intelligent device with a log of transactions maintained in storage, but the intelligence of the system has been .,noved to the vending server. This has the following far-reaching _.
..... 2) The logistic problems associated with transaction log uploads From CDUs no longer exist. 3) Fraud will be reduced since credit control can be more elegantly implemented. 4) The management, maintenance and security costs associated with the security modules in the off-line system will be vastly reduced because much fewer security modules are required. 5 ) Support for debt recovery can easily be integrated due to up-to-date information regarding every client being available. The disadvantages of on-line as opposed to off-line vending : I) The comparatively high cost of the communication required for the on-line vending system. 2) No vending can take place if the central vending server is unavailable. An alternative means must be provided. 3) No vending can take place if communication links are inoperable. 4) Network security needs special attention since the most cost effective transport for CVS will utilize public, insecure network infrastructure. These disadvantages of the on-line vending approach are deemed to be insignificant when compared to the advantages that will be provided by the relief of the administrative and financial difficulties present in the current off-line system.
In off-line vending, a transaction was completed by a customer going to some outlet that had a CDU, requesting a token for a specific ED and paying the appropriate amount of money. The customer was then given the token that the CDU generated without communicating with any other system.
In on-line vending, a transaction involves more communication between entities. Once a customer has requested a token From a CDU and paid appropriately, the CDU sends the request to a TM. This server, after checking the credibility of the CDU, records the transaction, generates the token, and sends the token back to the CDU. Because of this order of events, it is not possible for a CDU to defraud the token system or dispute that the transaction occurred. The operator of the CDU will thus have to pay for all of the prepaid electricity sold.
An important fact to be kept in mind is that the existing installed ED base does not need to be modified in any way for the on-line mode of operation described here, as the on-line vending affects only CVS, and not STS. Only the CDUs, SMSs and Th4s need to be updated. This represents a significant cost saving in terms of logistic and capital expenditure, since there are only thousands of CDUs in operation, compared to millions of EDs that have been deployed in South Africa. Only CVS has to be modified. Nothing needs to be changed in STS as the way in which the EDs function remains unchanged.
Iv. SECURITY PROTOCOLS
Ctyptographically, a means is required by which information can be conveyed between CDUs and T M s securely and reliably. The transfer must be secure in that it is not modified in any way or that fabricated information is not accepted. The transfer must be reliable in that all information transmitted is received (nothing is lost).
To this end, a communication link is required between every CDU and TM. This bi-directional communication link must be available every time that a transaction occurs. Due to the ubiquity of IP (Intemet Protocol) , it can be used to provide the necessary communication. However, IP itself provides no security whatsoever.
A suitable security protocol must be used to protect the information that is transmitted between the CDU and the vending server. It must ensure that information transmitted is not modified so that owners of CDUs can be sure that they will not be overcharged for tokens sold and customers buying tokens can be sure that the tokens received represent the value that was paid for and will work with the corresponding ED. It also ensures privacy in that customer information is not available outside the system. I ) Confidentiality (information transmitted can only be meaningfully interpreted by the intended parties). 2) Authentication (the origin of the message is as indicated and not sent from a false identity). 3) Integrity (that the message was not modified in transit and was received exactly as transmitted).
4)
Nonrepudiation (the sender cannot deny sending the message nor sending the contents of the message). 5 ) Access control (no parties may access a resource without the necessary permission).
SSL, XMUSOAP, and Kerberos were examined to
The following security features are required determine which provided the required security features.
A. SSL SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) provides point-to-point security between a client and a server that are connected by means of an insecure public network [4] . SSL is positioned immediately above the TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) layer of the Intemet, which means that any software that uses SSL can operate as if it were using TCP directly. SSL provides confidentiality, entity and data authentication and integrity of information transmitted over a connectionoriented T C P B link. SSL uses public key cryptography for the authentication of servers and clients.
In normal operation, SSL makes use of the Record Protocol. The Record Protocol uses an application message as input and prepares it for transmission by fragmenting, optionally compressing, adding a MAC (Message Authentication Code), encrypting and appending a Record Header. Fragmentation is required so that messages do not become too long when transmitted over the insecure public network. A MAC is calculated using either MDS (Message Digest, Version 5 ) or SHA-I (Secure Hash Algorithm). This prevents the message from being modified without being detected. Symmetric encryption is used, and may be one of IDEA (International Data Encryption Algorithm), RC2-40, DES (Data Encryption Standard), DEMO, Triple DES, Fortezza, RC4-40 or RC4-128.
The security parameters, such as MAC and encryption algorithm, need to be negotiated before they can be used. This is done by the Handshake Protocol and allows the server and client to authenticate each other before exchanging the security parameters for the connection. It consists of four phases: establish security capabilities, server authentication and key exchange, client authentication and key exchange, and finish.
The advantages of SSL for the problem at hand are: required confidentiality, authenticity and integrity of traffic are provided, authentication of communicating parties is performed, and SSL has been proven to be effective in providing security services in the Intemet.
The disadvantages of SSL are: communication is state based (both parties must record details pertaining to the communication), all data is unnecessarily encrypted, and a significant amount of time and processing power is wasted in setting up and using an SSL connection. Also, because SSL replaces the entire communication channel, there is no inherent form of nonrepudiation that can later be used as proof. XML also provides support for X.509 certificates b: r means of an XSO9DataElement. X.509 certificates are a widely used format for public-key certificates. They allow the identity of an entity to be proven and make the public key for th:%t entity available.
B. X W S O A P
SOAP (Simple Object Access Protocol) provi-ies the definition of XML-based information that can be used for exchanging structured and typed information between peers in a decentralized, distributed environment [6]. A SOAP message is a one-way transmission. Multiple SOAP messages can be combined to create conversational exchanges, such as is required during the sale of a token.
XMLISOAP allows information to be encrypted and digitally signed. This is done by making use of XKMS (XML Key Management Specification). XKMS allows publi: keys to be retrieved from a server to be used for encryption or signature verification.
Because XML is text-based, it is not terse. The more verbose storage of messages in XML allow XML to be more portable and thus used on a much wider range of computer systems.
The advantages of XMUSOAP for the problem at liand are: it is text-based (can be transported by virtually any kind of network and hardware), it is widely supported by industry, documents are hierarchical allowing logical struci.uring of information, and encryption and digital signatures can apply to complete messages or only parts of the data contained in messages. A digital signature can be part of the document. This, unlike SSL, provides a means of nonrepudiation of the data and originating party after the communication has concluded.
The disadvantage of XMUSOAP is that it is text-based which means that it is not compact in representing a given piece of infomation when compared to binary ]protocols. Communication resources will thus be more heavily loaded than strictly necessary.
C. Kerberos
Kerberos is an authentication system devised to provide a means for clients and servers to authenticate each other. The primary use of Kerberos is to allow a user or entity access to services. Kerberos provides confidentiality, authenlicity, and integrity of data that is transmitted over an insecure: network. It provides strong authentication of clients and sewers using conventional clyptography.
In the latest version of Kerberos (version S), arty type of encryption may be used. A tag is used to indicate tht: type that was used. Prior to this version, only DES was supported. Kerberos, however, is only an authentication system. No provision is made for &e transmission of data over links, even though Kerberos makes use of security feature!; such as encryption to ensure confidentiality and integrity ,of internal data. The data that is protected in this manner is used to achieve the required authentication and access contrd.
The advantages provided by Kerberos are: i; provides 0-7083-8605-1 /$17.00 2004 IEEE confidentiality, authenticity and integrity of traffic intemal to Kerberos, it has efficient operation due to secret key cryptography, the storage of security-related informiion is centralized, and software implementing Kerberos is freely available. The disadvantages of Kerberos for this system are: it does not provide for encryption of user data, and it is designed for human interaction by removing repetitive human tasks (such as entering passwords) hut this is not really advantageous for authenticating computer systems to each other.
D. Comparison Of Securiy Protocols
From the descriptions of the three security protocols discussed above, it is apparent that only XMLISOAP provides the required security features.
SSL is state based, resulting in unnecessary storage at both ends of the communication link. There is no inherent means of proving nonrepudiation, because SSL replaces the entire communication channel.
Kerberos does not provide a means for encrypting user data sent over communication channels.
XML/SOAP is text-based, which makes it particularly friendly to all types of computer networks, and it provides for confidentiality, integrity, nonrepudiation, authentication, and access control. However, in order to provide these services, XMUSOAP requires the use of public key cryptography as a building block. This is discussed in the next section.
V. PLBLICKEY INFRASTRUCTLIRE
It was determined that XMUSOAP meets the security requirements of the problem at hand. In order to make use of XMUSOAP to meet the security requirements, a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) system is required.
PKI is the term given to the systems, entities, and procedures that are required to make the use of public keys possible. This is because public key algorithms rely on one key for encryption and a different hut related key for decryption. This pair of keys has the important characteristic that it is computationally infeasible to determine the decryption key given only howledge of the cryptographic algorithm and the encryption key [7] . One key is kept secret, hut the other is made publicly available by means of a PIU system.
Once an entity (or the CA) has generated a public I private key pair, the public key must he distributed so that parties that receive a message that has been signed using a private key can obtain the corresponding public key to verify the signature. This distribution is achieved by means of Certificate Authorities (CAS). During normal operation, CAS provide a repository of public key certificates that are relevant to the system. CAS can also generate public /private key pairs when new entities require them or previous pairs were compromised and must be replaced. The CA in this system receives its authority from a higher CA, such as VeriSign or Thawte. Just as the CA creates and signs digital signatures for the CDUs and T M s in the CVS, it also must have a certificate c o n f b n g its identity from a higher level CA.
The identity and public key of all the entities associated with the CA are stored in digital certificates. These certificates shall be in X.SO9 format, which is a universally used format for the distribution ofpublic keys.
There will be one CA in this system, together with a backup should the primary fail. This CA will he available to generate all public I private key pairs and the corresponding certificates. All certificates will be available to all parties in the system.
In the system, there are T M s and CDUs that wish to communicate with each other by means of an l P cloud, as shown in Fig. 3 Because all TMs are connectcd lo the IP cloud, there is a direct link to the CA (and the backup CA) &hen a certificate is required. The CDUs can similarly communicate with the CA as required, although this will be much less hcqucnt as each CDU communicatcs with one or two TMs, but cnch TM communicates with many CDUs.
When a CDU transmits a message, the appropnatc parts of the mcssage will have D digital signature that is gcnerdtcd using the CDU's private key. The receiving TM will verify the signature by retrieving the public key of the source CDU from the CA. Similarly, when a CDU receives a messagc, it will \ e n @ the signature by using the soiuce TM*s public key obtained from the CA as a digiwl ccnificata.
All entities in the CVS (all CDUs and 'I'Ms) have unique IDS and pnvatc ksys. These trro pieces of information arc all that difleerentiatc CDUs from onc another and dificrentiate TMs from one another. The CA holds the concsponding public key availablc in the form of a certificate in a public repository The CDU's unique ID and thc CDU's private key are stored at the CDU. These can be stored either on thc CDU's Iocill hard disk drive, or, if a higher level of security is required that Each message sent between CDU and TM must have the appropriate security features so that nonrepudiation of origin and nonrepudiation of content can be assured. Both types of nonrepudiation can be implemented by the party sending the message encrypting the parts of the message that make it unique and signing it using its private key.
The purchase token transaction allows a CDU to request a token for a specific ED on behalf of a customer. The CDU stands surety for the value of the token that is to be issued and is liable to pay the distributor for the token that is provided. A CDU will only request a token given that the client has already paid for it. For the purchase token transaction, the following messages will be required (given from the CDU's point of view): 1) Request token of a certain value for a specific ED.
2) Receive a response with the customer's details to ensure that the details are correct. 3) Send a confirmation that the details are correct. 4) Receive the token itself.
The other transactions will be similar, where the CDU requests a token or information, and receives the appropriate response or ermr message.
The purchase token, re-issue token, specific management token, and general management token exchanges all have tokens at the CDU as the result. The update customer details exchange sends customer information &om the CDU to the T M . The purchase history exchange allows the CDU to receive the list of transactions for which it will be held liable. Such an exchange will typically be used during reconciliation at the CDU after a shift has finished.
VII. CONCLUSION
The off-line mode of operation that is currently used for the distribution of tokens for prepaid electricity is plagued by problems regarding security and logistics. These problems can largely be eliminated by utilizing on-line communication.
Even though on-line operation requires significandy more communication infrastructure that must be availab1.e at the instant of the transaction for the sale of a token to occur, it has the advantages of reducing the occurrence of fraud, simplifying synchronization, and ensuring that :;tatistical systems are kept up to date.
In order to implement such an on-line mode of operation, security features are required whereby the necessary information is protected from disclosure and the required level of nonrepudiation is provided. It was shown that XWL/SOAP meets the security requirements.
A PKI is required to support the security functions provided by XML/SOAP. This can be provided by local CA:: that are accessible by all CDUs and all TMs. 
